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To protect the United States’ 4.5 million miles of Economic Exclusion Zone, 
maritime forces are directed to conduct homeland defense missions and support civil 
authorities as far from U.S. shorelines as possible to protect the country from 
transnational threats. In order to protect the United States from transnational organized 
crime regimes and their continued maritime narcotics trafficking, the U.S. Navy requires 
a surface combatant to fulfill these interdiction missions. Therefore, with the Navy’s 
decommissioning of its patrol frigates, should the Navy plan development of a new 
vessel, rebuild the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, or refocus the LCS program to 
replace the current frigate’s capabilities in combating narcotic trafficking? In turn, the 
Oliver Hazard Perry class was a sound platform that performed well, the LCS is a 
troubled program facing severe financial, stability, and lethality issues, while the design 
and construction of a new frigate is entirely too costly and time consuming. With these 
considerations in mind, this thesis proposes the reconstruction of the Oliver Hazard Perry 
class frigate for maritime security operations, as a result of its illustrious multirole career, 
survivability, and relatively cheaper price point than the increasingly expensive and 
unproven LCS ship class. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the ongoing emphasis on monitoring narcotic trafficking into the United 
States, the U.S. Navy has been very proactive in using its Oliver Hazard Perry class 
frigates to deter and stop drug traffickers from transporting their product using the seas. 
These converted maritime security vessels were pivotal in drug interdiction operations, 
humanitarian efforts, as well as joint international naval training exercise platforms. 
However, the Navy accelerated the decommissioning schedule of its frigates to be 
completed by end of the year 2015, and there is not a clear action forward to replace these 
assets. Additionally, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the supposed platform to 
replace the frigates, is stagnant, contains many development issues, has no clear mission 
for drug interdiction, and faces reduction in procurement.1 Considering these issues and 
an unclear future of 4th fleet United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 
operations, this thesis examines the question: Should the Navy plan development of a 
new vessel, rebuild the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, or refocus the LCS program to 
replace the current frigate’s capabilities in combating narcotic trafficking?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
President Barack Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy legitimizes maritime 
transnational threats and irregular challenges as primary threats to the U.S. homeland.2 
However, though the United States has the world’s largest Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of 95,000 miles of coastline and 10,000 miles of navigable waters,3 the assets to 
protect its maritime security from illicit drug trafficking are drastically diminishing or are 
                                                 
1 Christopher P. Cavas, “Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships, 1 Shipbuilder,” Defense News, December 17, 
2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/12/16/littoral-combat-ship-lcs-navy-budget-
fighter-super-hornet-joint-strike-fighter-lockheed-martin-fincantieri-austal/77452734/. 
2 White House, The, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 4, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission Securing our Homeland, Maritime 




no longer available.4 This presents a serious concern for homeland security and the safety 
of U.S. citizens. Former U.S. Representative Mark E. Souder argued, “For the first time, 
our actionable intelligence exceeds our interdiction capabilities in transit zones…we 
know of specific boatloads of drugs heading north that we cannot intercept because of the 
lack of interception assets in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.”5 Additionally, the 
reduction of these assets results in damaging effects for U.S. foreign policy and increased 
partnerships with foreign nations in this region, where traffickers are exploiting the 
United States’ drawback.6 In turn, the increased need for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 
vessels, along with law enforcement detachment teams, is vital to securing U.S. borders 
from transnational organized crime.7 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a significant amount of literature concerning the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Coast Guard involvement in narcotic interdiction on the high seas. A number of sources 
regarding narcotic interdiction and tactical assets come from various official U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), State, Department of the Navy, and Coast Guard 
publications; numerous Congressional Research Service reports; and U.S. Naval 
Proceedings articles. According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
published in March 2014 by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard assets are imperative in the war on drugs because close to 90 percent of all illegal 
narcotics heading for United States originates in South America and is smuggled through 
the seven Central American countries using vast sea lanes.8 The most important official 
                                                 
4 Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong., (2005) (statement of U.S. Representative Mark E. Souder), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24892/html/CHRG-109hhrg24892.htm. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States 
Southern Command: Before the 113th Congress House Armed Services Committee (2014), 33, 
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/2014_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_HASC_FINAL_
PDF.pdf. 
7 Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas. 
8 United States Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, vol. 1 (March 2014): 9, 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/index.htm. 
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reports concerning these missions and the need for naval surface assets are delineated in 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower, Naval Operations Concept, and Posture 
Statement of Commander, United States Southern Command. These joint publications 
direct the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps to collaborate strategically and 
tactically to maintain maritime security.9 
1. IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME SECURITY 
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower provides direction and maritime 
strategy for “mission-tailored maritime forces to be globally distributed in order to 
contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships, and 
to prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises.”10 Furthermore, maritime forces are directed 
to conduct homeland defense missions and support civil authorities as far from U.S. 
shorelines as possible to protect the country from transnational threats, such as terrorists 
and other extremists; weapons of mass destruction proliferation; piracy; trafficking of 
drugs, people, and weapons; and other criminals.11 Additionally, within this strategy, the 
document outlines key core capabilities such as forward presence, deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, and maritime security. Within maritime security, it maintains that the 
United States highly prioritizes use of maritime forces to mitigate and enforce illegal 
narcotics trafficking, and other seaborne illegal enterprises.12 
Similar to the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower document from 2015, the 
Naval Operations Concept, completed in 2010, stresses the importance of maritime 
security for the United States and its national security and economic prosperity.13 This 
document highlights the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR), which 
establishes protocols that allow various agencies operating under the maritime security 
                                                 
9 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2015); U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, 
Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: 2010), 36–39, 
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. 
10 U.S. Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 7. 
11 Ibid., 11. 
12 Ibid., 13. 
13 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Operations Concept 2010, 35. 
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umbrella to coordinate and effectively operate.14 Furthermore, the United States Naval 
Service (which includes the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps) is the lead agency/
entity for the MOTR plan,15 and the Department of Defense is the “single lead agency of 
the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of 
illegal drugs into the United States”16 Additionally, the Naval Operations Concept 
specifically argues that maritime security is only achieved when government assets, 
private sectors, multinational organizations such as naval and maritime security forces, 
and others coordinate together to combat illegal activity. It further touches on the naval 
service’s assets of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, aircraft, and law enforcement 
detachment (LEDET) teams playing critical roles in “conducting unilateral assistance at 
sea, law enforcement, and maritime interception operations to multinational counter-
piracy operations.”17  
2. MARITIME SECURITY ASSETS 
To carry out the missions laid out in the naval publications mentioned earlier and 
to continue maritime security capabilities regarding illegal drug interdiction, the Posture 
Statement of General John F. Kelley, USMC Commander, U.S. Southern Command to the 
113th Congress House Armed Services Committee argues that budget cuts, reduction of 
service deployments, and depleting U.S. Navy and Coast Guard surface vessels are 
seriously impairing the ability to protect the U.S. homeland.18 Furthermore, it highlights 
that USSOUTHCOM bears the full responsibility for distributing assets to intercept the 
majority of all heroin and cocaine sold in the United States. However, without valuable 
assets such as the U.S. Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry frigates and U.S. Coast Guard High 
Endurance Cutters, now being decommissioned, the missions cannot be accomplished. 
                                                 
14 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Operations Concept 2010, 37. 
15 Ibid. 
16 By power under Section 124 of Title 10 in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990–91. 
Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas.  
17 U.S. Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2010, 36–38. 
18 Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, 2–3. 
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These diminished assets caused Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF) the ability to 
miss out on 74 percent of actionable drug trafficking events.19  
a. Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Oliver Hazard Perry FFG (Fast Frigate Guided 
Missile) class frigate has been an extremely valuable asset for homeland defense 
missions. After their original weapons systems were removed, they became the lead 
platform for conducting counter narcotic, trafficking, proliferation, and piracy missions. 
The Congressional Budget Office publication, Options for Combining the Navy’s and the 
Coast Guard’s Small Combatant Programs, highlights the success of the 51-ship 
program for their role in homeland defense for over 30 years.20 However, numerous 
articles such as Janette Steele’s “Farewell, Frigates,” reveals that the steady decline of the 
fleet’s frigate force is being stepped up because of the LCS program coming online, and 
because they “lack the multi-mission capability that the Navy now requires for modern 
combat.”21 
b. LCS Program 
To replace the decommissioning frigates of the U.S. Navy, the Littoral Combat 
Ship was designed and built to be a multi-mission ship much like its predecessor, with the 
ability to have removable mission packages. However, according to Congressional 
Research Service reports, numerous construction problems, heavy corrosion, mission 
module failures, cost increases, and set multi-year building contracts have severely 
degraded the program and production.22 These reports, along with articles published in 
Naval Proceedings magazine, give insight into the failures and blunders of the LCS 
                                                 
19 Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, 19. 
20 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 
Small Combatant Programs (Washington, DC: CBO, 2009). 
21 Jeanette Steele, “Farewell, Frigates,” San Diego Union Tribune, September 24, 2014, 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/sep/24/gary-mcclusky-frigate-navy-deployment-decommission/. 
22 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RL33741) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, December 24, 2014); Ronald O’Rourke and Moshe Schwartz, Multiyear Procurement and 
Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background Issues for Congress (CRS Report RL41909) 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 30, 2014). 
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program.23 Most notably, by 2007, the LCS unit cost increased almost 80 percent from its 
initial design cost.24 
c. New Small Surface Combatant 
A recent Congressional Research Service report addresses the issues of the LCS 
program and sub-par performance of existing ship designs and capabilities, and gives 
insight to the current and future plan for the LCS program. In response to former 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s restructured plan for the LCS program and the 
development of a new small surface combatant, the Navy plans to replace the LCS ships 
with a new small combatant based on the current LCS hull designs.25 Furthermore, this 
report proposes a combination of 52 LCS’s and new frigates that could meet the Navy’s 
plan for a small surface combatant force. This plan calls for a ship to be lethal and 
survivable like those of current frigates.26 The report also presents issues and concerns 
for the design and survivability of the new small surface combatant being built on the 
existing LCS hull. Naval expert Norman Polmar further discusses the benefits and 
concerns for this LCS transition to a frigate for hull numbers after the originally funded 
32 ships, arguing that principal candidates for a new small surface combatant will likely 
become another abomination in becoming an official ship designation.27 Additionally, 
Sydney J. Freedburg questions the U.S. Navy’s motive for developing a new small 
surface combatant based on the current LCS design.28 This transition to a proposed, more 
lethal combatant based on the current problematic design suggests that defense leaders 
                                                 
23 Neil A. Pettigrew, “When Quality Slips,” Proceedings, January 2015, 58; Gregory V. Cox, 
“Lessons Learned from the LCS,” Proceedings, January 2015, 36; Jim Griffin, “A More Flexible Fleet,” 
Proceedings, January 2015, 30. 
24 Griffin, “A More Flexible Fleet,” 31. 
25 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress, (CRS Report No. RL33741) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, January 30, 2015). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Norman Polmar, “LCS Frigate Options,” Proceedings, January 2015, 86–87. 
28 Sydney J. Freedburg Jr., “McCain Warns Navy on LCS Upgrade,” Breaking Defense (March 10, 
2015), http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/mccain-warns-navy-on-lcs-upgrade/.  
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and contractors have surpassed the law of diminishing return on the current LCS 
platform, and have no clear path to separate from its design advocacy. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Maritime security is vital to the homeland defense strategy to secure our 
shorelines and harbors from illicit drugs and organized crime. This mission requires 
numerous vessels to operate within the confines of littoral waters as well as blue water 
defense. These ships must be simple, multi-capable vessels that can operate in 
conjunction with the Coast Guard and foreign navies while conducting counter-drug 
operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific oceans, as well as possess the ability to 
forward deploy with other nations for maritime security training and operational 
missions. As the JIATF Deputy Director Brigadier General Steve DePalmer argues, 
“They don’t need to be destroyers, they don’t need to be fancy, they just need to be 
something that floats, that can trundle along, maybe launch a helicopter, and also launch 
a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment.”29  
Based on the research thus far, it is possible to make a few hypotheses for future 
development or purchase of a much-needed small surface combatant for maritime 
security and drug interdiction:  
 Stop construction of the LCS program after the 24 ships that are currently 
under a block buy contract of $538 million (excluding costs for mission 
packages) per vessel. Operate these to be strictly small surface combatants 
with their (Surface Warfare) SUW module in place for drug interdiction.30 
The Surface Warfare module gives the platform extensive offensive power 
with its surface weaponry and large security boat deployment from the aft 
end of the vessel for boarding team operations. However, this option does 
not give the Navy the ability to use them as multi-mission vessels because 
of their documented lack of survivability, which will increase the $538 
million price significantly to engineer construction change orders.  
 Rebuild a modern version Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate. These ships, at 
$600 million procurement cost (in 2015 dollars), would be a cheaper 
option to the LCS if their technical weapons systems were removed 
(reducing the $600 million price tag) and refit for basic maritime security 
                                                 
29 Meghann Meyers, “Official Seeks Larger Counter Drug Fleet,” Navy Times (April 21, 2014): 22.  
30 O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program. 
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operations. Additionally, their survivability has been battle tested (no 
further action needed, unlike the LCS) and they were the lead patrol 
vessels for JIATF and USSOUTHCOM drug interdiction missions since 
that program’s inception.31 
 Procure a multi-mission frigate such as the National Security Cutter the 
U.S. Coast Guard currently uses. At $684 million per unit cost they have 
the ability to conduct any mission that the current U.S. Navy destroyer 
does, minus launching anti-air missiles, at a fraction of the cost of the 
destroyer (over $1.6 Billion).32 
 Procure a similar multi-capable frigate or corvette from a foreign Navy, 
such as the Israeli Eilat class frigate (which the United States currently 
builds for Israel) or the German Braunschweig (K130) class corvette. At a 
procurement cost of $260 million, the Eilat class frigate is a cheap and 
simple surface combatant that fills every capability of modern day 
frigates.33 The sportier Braunschweig corvette was designed to be a 
modular type vessel to be constructed cheaply with a high degree of 
customization for the buyer. This allows the buyer to insert their sensors 
or weapons systems during construction to meet specific mission 
capabilities.34 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis conducts a comparative case study examining the capabilities, 
limitations, pros and cons of the current Oliver Hazard Perry platform, the LCS program, 
or possible production of a new Small Surface Combatant for maritime counternarcotic 
operations. First it will examine the development of the Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate 
illustrated in Figure 1 (USS Rodney M. Davis FFG-60) and its illustrious campaign as a 
bargain workhorse and as an anti-narcotics sea baron. Then it will analyze why the 
current war on maritime counternarcotic trafficking resulted in the Perry’s transformation 
to a counter drug patrol platform. Then the analysis will shift toward the Perry’s 
                                                 
31 “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class,” Newsletter, accessed October 7, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ffg-7.htm. 
32 Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, (CRS 
Report R42567) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, October 31, 
2012), 3–4. 
33 “Sons of Sa’ar? Israel’s Next Generation Frigates,” Defense Industry Daily, accessed March 17, 
2013, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/an-lcs-for-israel-04065/. 
34 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html. 
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replacement, the uncertain and highly criticized Littoral Combat Ship, for future anti-
narcotic operations. Furthermore, the analysis will then introduce the possibility of 
procuring a completely different vessel and their possible advantages, followed by a 
comparison of each platform to determine which one of the vessels is better suited for the 
counternarcotic mission set.  
The analysis uses government publications such as Congressional Research 
Service reports, Armed Services Committee reports, current presidential and agency 
strategies, as well as current and former military expenditures reports within the United 
States’ federal budget. This is important because the current mission of narcotic 
interdiction is vital to the homeland defense model and current maritime security 
strategies. In addition, it is important to analyze government expenditures toward 
programs, such as the LCS, and their effectiveness to achieve their designed capabilities. 
If they are not achieving these capabilities, it is important to recognize these shortfalls, 
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II. OLIVER HAZARD PERRY FRIGATE 
 
Figure 1.  USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG-60)35 
A. U.S. NAVY WORKHORSE IS BORN: HISTORY OF THE OLIVER 
HAZARD PERRY FRIGATE 
In the peak of the Cold War, United States defense leaders (abruptly sensitive to 
possible ballistic missile attacks following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962) yearned for 
a small, capable, and inexpensive multi mission surface combatant to replace retiring 
World War II destroyers. Early replacements were expensive, big, sluggish, and required 
extensive crew sizes for everyday operations. However, urgency for quick, strong, and 
nimble platforms capable of protecting maritime shipping, screening enemy missile 
attacks, and Anti-Submarine Warfare defense36 grew exponentially. Focusing on keeping 
the cost and size down of its surface combatants, the U.S. Navy workhorse was born.  
                                                 
35 Source: Stephen Saunders, “Oliver Hazard Perry Class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 116th revised ed. 
(Englewood, CO: IHS Global Inc., 2015), 945. 
36 John Keller, “A Once Proud Class of U.S. Navy Surface Warships Is Quickly Fading Away,” 




Forecasted to be the inexpensive “backbone of the Navy’s sea control fleet,”37 the 
Oliver Hazard Perry frigate facilitated a stout open-ocean escort of large amphibious 
ships and aircraft carriers, underway replenishment groups, and convoys, while also 
conducting undersea warfare protection against the Soviet Union.38 Moreover, its design 
capabilities packed two multi-mission helicopters as an additional critical asset to 
maritime and anti-submarine warfare. The United States Department of Defense stressed 
the need for these vessels as an “Emergency solution to cost effectively cope with the 
mushrooming early 1970s Soviet underwater warfare menace in the face of the attrition 
of the antiquated World War II era anti-submarine destroyer escort types.”39 Based on 
these mission capabilities, the Perry would preserve logistical sustainment and sea-line 
communication effectiveness for the United States and allied forces abroad.40 However, 
negotiations and arguments between defense officials yielded disdained views for the 
need of the inexpensive single screwed vessel for those operations.41 
Many naval admirals and defense officials’ contempt for the Perry came at a time 
of limited shipbuilding funds and acquisition complications. These officials objected on 
the basis that the Navy required fewer, more sophisticated ships.42 Furthermore, they 
argued that, “these less capable ships would hinder, not help, the fleet.”43 Fearing this 
interpretation would impair current and future naval fleets with insufficient hulls for 
mission effectiveness, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt ordered the 
inexpensive Perry class vessel into production.44  
                                                 
37 Jerome H. Stolarow, Navy’s FFG-7 Class Frigate Shipbuilding Program and Other Ship Program 
Issues (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979), 2, 
http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/108301.pdf. 
38 “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class.” 
39 Jim Bloom, “Bargain Basement Workhorse: The Amazing Career of Perry-Class Frigates,” Sea 
Classics, November 2008, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/236084503/citation/7546591D082C4D1BPQ/1. 
40 Stolarow, FFG-7 Shipbuilding Issues. 
41 Kit Bonner, “Search for the Perfect Frigate,” Sea Classics, December 2003, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/236050569/citation/8E5416FD21364A23PQ/1. 





In May 1973, Congress authorized $202 million for lead ship (FFG-7) designers 
to develop the Perry’s initial hull.45 In October 1973, the lead ship construction contract 
was awarded to Bath Iron Works Corporation for $94.4 million as a single hull test 
platform.46 Two years later in March 1975, construction began, delivering the lead ship 
in November 1977.47 Prior to the delivery of the lead ship in February 1976, the U.S. 
Navy awarded two different shipbuilding companies contracts: Bath Iron Works and 
Todd Shipyard Corporation in construction of the 50 proposed Perry Frigates, including 
three purchased by the Australian Navy.48 
1. Cost 
DOD officials estimated the total program cost for 50 Perry frigates to be $3.2 
billion, averaging $64.8 million per vessel. However, by September 30, 1978, that 
number rose significantly to $10.1 billion for 52 ships, averaging $194 million per vessel. 
This significant increase was by virtue of unexpected shipbuilding costs and additional 
equipment such as towed sonar, fin stabilizers, and electronic equipment not quoted in 
original estimated price to be added.49 
2. Mission Design and Specifications: Workhorse Empowerment  
Post design and production of the Perry yielded high expectations for the 
relatively inexpensive multi mission platform. Built for speed, agility, and multi-mission 
operations, these steel hulled, aluminum super structured vessels exceeded their 
designers’ expectations in air, surface, and subsurface defense.50 Moreover, the 
combatant excelled during numerous independent and counter-drug operations, maritime 
                                                 





50 Keller, “A Once Proud Class,” 2. 
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interception operations, and multi-lateral exercises with foreign navies.51 These strengths 
of power by a surface combatant were achievable through their design, weapon 
distribution, and crew manifestation. 
The Perry’s lethal design, engineering plant, and weapon load out made its 
mission effectiveness comparable to its larger counterparts at a fraction of their size. 
Early vessels in the illustrious program: FFG 7, 9–35, and 44 had a length of 445 feet 
(133.5 meters) and a beam of 45 feet (13.5 meters); whereas the updated long hull OHP 
(Oliver Hazard Perry) frigates had a length of 453 feet (135.9 meters) and a beam of 45 
feet (13.5 meters).52 The longer-hulled Perry frigates were extended to accommodate the 
SQQ-89 Anti-Submarine Warfare suite and communication capability with the new 
LAMPS III equipped SH-60 Seahawk helicopters.53 Both variants of the Perry had 
shallow navigational drafts of 25 feet six inches, the capability of reaching in excess of 
30 knots in speed, and an endurance capability of 4,500 nautical miles cruising at 20 
knots.54  
The Perry’s speed and agility were remarkable tools in their ability to achieve 
maritime dominance. Topping speeds comparative to their larger cruiser and destroyer 
counterparts; yet, two less engines and shallower drafts than those, allowed the OHP to 
travel and maneuver in shallower seas (littoral waters), giving unprecedented value to the 
U.S. Navy, especially in maritime security operations. As Jim Bloom writes, “The patrol 
frigate may have been built to ‘economy-car’ standards, but it would move on Corvette 
engines: twin HP General Electric LM2500 gas turbine engines.”55 Considered sports 
cars of the current Navy, gas turbine ships were easier to maintain, required fewer 
engineers, accelerated faster than steam driven ships, and could start and stop much faster 
than their predecessors.56 Their modern engineering plants and smaller crew sizes were 
                                                 
51 “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class.” 
52 Saunders, Jane’s Ships, 945. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Bloom, “Bargain Basement Workhourse.” 
56 Ibid. 
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unparalleled in design and concept compared to similar foreign vessels of their size, and 
in addition to their contemporary construction and performance, the Perry’s other 
specifications (see Table 1) were even more impressive: 
Table 1.   Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate Specifications (FFG-7)57 
 
3. Survivability: True Testament of a Workhorse 
The Perry’s undeniable speed, agility, and employment of weapons served as a 
testament to its designers and operators alike. However, the class’s true value comes from 
its substantial survivability. The Perry’s designers focused heavily on curtailing 
vulnerabilities to the “cheap kill.” According to defense leaders, a cheap kill, “Occurs 
when a damaged system on a ship prevents the ship from completing its mission even 
though there is little or no physical damage to the ship’s structure.”58 These commonly 
                                                 
57 Adapted from specifications table on Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Saunders, Jane’s Ships, 
945. 
58 Stolarow, FFG-7 Shipbuilding Issues, 13. 
Power Plant
(2) General Electric LM  2500 Gas Turbine Engines
1 Shaft  (CPP Propeller): 41,000 shaft  horsepower
Lengt h
Short Hull: 455 Feet (133.5 M eters)
Long Hull: 453 Feet (135.9 M eters) LAM PS M od.
B eam 45 Feet (13.5 M eters)
D isp lacement 4,100 Tons (Full Load)
Speed 29 Plus Knots (Classif ied)
R ange
4,200 Naut ical M iles @ 20 KTS
5,000 Nautical M iles @ 18 KTS
Fuel 587 Tons + 64 Tons of  Helicpoter Fuel
A ircraf t (2) SH-60 Seahawk Helicopters 
C rew Size 13 Off icers; 287 Enlisted
A rmament
M K 13 M od 4 Standard M issile Launcher (Removed)
(36) Standard M issiles (Removed)
(4) Harpoon (Ant i-Ship M issiles) (Removed)
(6) M K-46 Torpedos
(1) 76mm (3-inch)/62 Caliber M K 75 Rapid Fire Gun
(1) Phalanx CIWS (Close In Weapon System) 20 mm Gait lin Gun
(1) 25mm Chain Gun
C ombat  Syst ems
AN/SPS-49 Air Search Radar
AN/SPS-55 Surface Search Radar
M K92 Fire Control System
AN/SLQ-32 Electronics Warfare System
AN/SQS-56 Sonar
M K36 SBOC Decoy System
AN/SQR-19 Towed Array Sonar System
AN/ SQQ-89 ASW Integrat ion Suite
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occur when fragmentations from proximity-fused weapons destroy exposed under 
armored vital systems and as result of shock waves from subsurface explosions damaging 
installed vital systems.59 To diminish concerns of cheap kills and other fragmentation 
damage, designers placed 19-mm aluminum-alloy armor around the Perry’s weapons 
magazines spaces, surrounded main engine spaces with 16-mm steel, and installed 19-
mm Kevlar armor throughout significant electronic and command spaces.60 This 
fortification was put to test during early operation in the late 1980s. 
On May 17, 1987, and April 15, 1988, U.S. Navy workhorses USS Stark (FFG-
31) and USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) became a testament of the Perry’s superior 
design, survivability, toughness, and tenacity of their crews. Early afternoon on May 17, 
1987, two Iraqi Exocet anti-ship missiles fired from Iraqi jets struck the USS Stark in the 
Persian Gulf, in a case of mistaken identity.61 The attack punched a hole 10–15 feet in 
diameter into the superstructure of the Perry class frigate, and her ship’s crew worked 
diligently and tirelessly for over 24 hours before bringing blazing fires and flooding 
under control.62 Moreover, approximately a year later on April 15, 1988, the USS Samuel 
B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf, blowing a 15 feet hole into the hull, 
snapping the keel, knocking its two gas turbines off of their mounts and flooding the 
main engine room.63 Despite structural damage that would be fatal to most ships, the 
Perry frigates defied all critics, withstanding overwhelming damage and staying afloat. In 
turn, as a result of the Perry class’s relative stable armor, system redundancy, and crew 
size, both vessels were quickly repaired and returned to the fleet, further corroborating 
their robust and extremely tough platform capabilities. 
                                                 
59 Stolarow, FFG-7 Shipbuilding Issues, 13. 
60 “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class.” 
61 Orlando Sentinel, “Iraq Attacks U.S. Frigate—1 Dead Pentagon Says Hit Was Case of Mistaken 
Identity,” May 18, 1987, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/277067717/abstract/3671898E08EE4777PQ/1. 
62 Ibid. 




C. NEW MISSION: ANTI-NARCOTIC THOROUGHBRED 
The culmination of the Cold War left naval and defense leaders craving 
something more high tech than inexpensive combat workhorses. Based on this 
assumption, the Perry class’ high-end technological AEGIS cruiser and destroyer big 
brothers eclipsed the frigates. Starved of funding, manning, and general guidance, the 
Perry class became a mission-less platform. As Jim Bloom asserts, “The frigate was 
considered to remain in service as a valuable ‘utility infielder.’”64 As a result, the Navy 
refocused its Perry class frigates away from large “blue water” operations to more 
shoreline eccentric maritime security operations missions.65 
During the Perry’s refocus, U.S. naval officials began cutting funding and its 
operational time at sea. As a cost cutting measure, the U.S. Navy eliminated the Perry’s 
air defense capability by removing its unsustainable SM-1R/Harpoon missile launcher 
and aging fire control combat system.66 Based on this approach, further funding was not 
allocated to the program and the missile launchers welded shut for placement of a 25mm 
chain gun. As deputy director of Surface Warfare Division of the CNO, Admiral Mark J. 
Edwards illustrated, “The missile-less Perry ships retained ‘tremendous war fighting 
capability,’ had access to areas where other ships could not go, and worked well with 
Navies and Coast Guards of other Nations.”67 As this focus made headway, the Navy’s 
workhorse established a new formidable mission in anti-narcotic operations. 
1. Anti-narcotics Operations 
In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. officials were still grappling with the war on 
drugs and transnational organized crime. After stringent FAA regulations were imposed, 
the flow of narcotics transitioned from air trafficking to more sea borne lanes. In light of 
this, defense leaders and law enforcement officials discovered that the Perry frigates 
possessed the perfect solution of endurance, size, and capability to conduct anti-narcotics, 
                                                 
64 Bloom, “Bargain Basement Workhorse.” 
65 Keller, “A Once Proud Class.” 
66 Bonner, “Search for the Perfect Frigate.” 
67 Bloom, “Bargain Basement Workhorse.” 
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anti-piracy and joint task force operations in the fight against transnational organized 
crime.68 In particular, these vessels proved invaluable in USSOUTHCOM/ 4th Fleet 
operations in countering narcotics trafficking in and around the AOR. As Rear Admiral 
Samuel Perez, former JIATF South Deputy Director, writes, “The FFG’s are our 
mainstay. FFG’s have legs so they can remain on station, good speed to get where we 
need them, and a good sensor suite. They have well trained crews who know how to 
search a body of water. Plus the frigates have helicopters. They are great platforms!”69As 
a result, the Perry’s have conducted 16.3 percent of naval operation days in support of 
counternarcotic missions,70 maintaining high levels of mission effectiveness for threats 
against U.S. homeland security.  
 
                                                 
68 Edward H. Lundquist, “Frigates—Obsolete in the Current Geopolitical Situation?” Naval Forces, 
(2010), 24. 
69 Ibid. 
70 “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class.” 
 19
III. SEABORNE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING: NEED FOR 
SURFACE SECURITY WORKHORSE 
Maintaining homeland security, in particular the immense illegal seaborne 
trafficking missions along the United States’ vast oceanic Economic Exclusive Zone 
(EEZ), is a multi-level issue. Drug interdiction missions in the eastern Pacific and 
Caribbean are highly increasing in volume; yet, they are becoming a lesser priority 
among government officials in the current geopolitical security environment. Those 
officials, in the defense budget and asset acquisition realm, opted to sever ties with the 
Oliver Hazard Perry frigate because of its aging platform and its failed attempts to keep 
up with technology. Once well renowned workhorses in the fight against counternarcotic 
movements in blue and littoral waters, the OHP frigates have been scrapped or sold off to 
the highest foreign bidder. Today the frigate is gone, and the United States Coast Guard 
is struggling to pick up the immense counternarcotic interdiction workload advocated for 
in numerous security strategies and law enforcement directives. 
The counternarcotic mission is essential in preserving homeland security. U.S. 
government officials concur with this urgency emphasizing, “Illegal drug trafficking 
continues to threaten the safety, security, and public health of the U.S. society. Illegal 
drugs also place significant strain on our Nation’s health care and criminal justice 
systems, costing U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars annually.”71 Furthermore, 
drug trafficking is believed to be accountable for 80 percent of violent crimes and 
murders, social problems, and drug abuse within Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands and 
Mexico.72 However, maritime interdiction of this trafficking is complex and always 
evolving. Based on this notion, this chapter focuses on the critical need for maritime 
security frigates in the fight against ocean borne narcotic trafficking delineated in various 
government/military strategies.  
                                                 
71 Subcommittee Staff on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, “Subcommittee Hearing on 
Western Hemisphere Drug Interdiction Efforts” (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, June 12, 
2015), 1, http://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2015-06-16_coast_guard_hearing_ssm.pdf. 
72 White House, The, Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 
January 2015), 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-
research/caribbeanstrategy5.pdf.. 
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A. SMUGGLING ON THE HIGH SEAS 
The oceanic interdiction mission puts a great strain on law enforcement and 
military agencies. This is most prominent because as Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, professor of 
National Security Affairs at Naval Postgraduate School, points out, “Criminal agents 
create technology responses that are simple and cost-effective, and consistently defeat 
actions of government agents.”73 This is most evident in the Caribbean region where 
maritime cocaine flow from South America “has doubled over the past four years from 
42 metric tons in 2010 to 95 metric tons in 2013, and now represents approximately 15 
percent of total documented cocaine flow in the Western Hemisphere.”74 This growth in 
trafficking is evidence that the drug trade is increasing not only in the Caribbean theater, 
but also most importantly in the deeper blue waters of the Eastern Pacific where the 
largest portion of the U.S.’s Economic Exclusive Zone lies.  
The Eastern Pacific comprises an extensive portion of the 4.5 million square miles 
of U.S. coastline or EEZ.75 Along this coastline lies the largest allocation of illegal drug 
trafficking on the high seas. According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report of 2014, roughly 90 percent of all illegal narcotics smuggled into the United 
States from Colombia, travel through one or more of the seven Central American 
countries via the Eastern Pacific.76 Figure 2 illustrates the seven million square miles of 
Drug Transit Zones used by oceanic traffickers, depicting the flow of narcotics out of 
Columbia and Venezuela into the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean regions of the U.S. EEZ. 
                                                 
73 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Stigmergy at the Edge: Adversarial Stigmergy in the War on Drugs,” 
Cognitive Systems Research, vol. 38, ed. Ted G. Lewis and Leslie Marsh (Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier, 
2016), 1. 
74 Caribbean Counternarcotics Strategy, 19 
75 U.S. Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 26. 
76 United States Department of State, “Drug and Chemical Control,” International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report (Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
March 2014), 9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf. 
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Figure 2.  Drug Transit Zones77 
Drug Transit Zones are highly valuable for narcotic traffickers because they use 
these sea-lanes as transportation of their products—undetected. Nieto Gomez asserts this 
ideological movement as,  
How to optimize the transport of a series of stable banned chemical 
products to minimize risk, from a territory where they are produced and 
manufactured but have little market value, to another one where they are 
highly appreciated by a consumer market, avoiding the deadly predatory 
opposition of law enforcement agents, military, and other adversarial 
forces.78  
This feat is accomplished by using go-fast boats (or Pangas) and semi/fully 
submersible submarines. The next section describes these different types of drug 
smuggling vessels.  
1. Narco-Submarines  
Narco-submarines are highly vital assets in the narcotic trafficking trade because 
they carry immense payloads and are difficult to detect. The U.S. Foreign Military 
Studies Office (FMSO) report on “Narco-Submarines” reveals that nearly 80 percent of 
                                                 
77 Source: “Subcommittee Hearing on Western Hemisphere Drug Interdiction Efforts.” 
78 Nieto-Gomez, “Stigmergy.” 
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narcotics smuggled into the United States are transported via maritime lines.79 Of that 80 
percent, 30 percent were transported via narco-subs.80 These subs “Are custom made, 
self-propelled vessels built by drug traffickers to smuggle their goods. Over the years, 
their engineering, design and technology have improved, thus making them more difficult 
to detect and capture.”81 These vessels typically come in three different variants and can 
carry upwards to seven metric tons of cocaine per run: Low profile Vessels (LPV)/Self 
Propelled Semi-Submersibles, Submersibles/Submersible Vessels (FSV), and Narco-
Torpedoes (which are towed vessels).82 Though these vessels require an immense amount 
of time, money, and secrecy to build, they yield a great deal more in return when a 




Figure 3.  Narcotic Semi-Submersible83 
2. Panga “Go Fast” Boats 
Narco-subs carry a great deal of product and bear a large price tag. However, 
another form of trafficking vessel used, called Pangas (or “go-fast boats”), presents a 
                                                 
79 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for 
Drug Smuggling Purposes” (Washington, DC: InSight Crime & Small Wars Journal, May 2014), 6, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/Interagency/Narco-Submarines.pdf. 
80 Ibid., 7. 
81 Ibid.,14. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Source: Ramirez and Bunker, “Narco-Subs,”14. 
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cheaper, less costly approach for transportation. These are normally used in Caribbean 
trafficking, but are also lucrative in the Eastern Pacific transit zones. Pangas are simple 
wooden fishing vessels that are much smaller than subs, semi-narrow in nature, and are 
very fast (usually containing multiple outboard engines). According to Department of 
Homeland Security officials, Pangas “Have no inside floor, no cockpit, and no extraneous 
markings… they are efficient, cost effective, have superior handling, and are difficult to 
detect and often travel at night in order to avoid detection.”84 These particular vessels, 
like the one shown in Figure 4, carry a much lesser risk of being caught because of their 
speed and ability to jettison (throw overboard) their product if pursued. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Drug Panga “Go-Fast”85 
As a result of these narcotics (cocaine mostly) entering U.S. borders via the high 
seas, from 2000–2010 Americans consumed more than 2,867 metric tons (6.3 million 
pounds) of cocaine; in addition to accounting for more than 44.6 million arrests, and 
                                                 
84 Peter T. Hedge, Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime 
Border, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2015), 2, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=787381. 
85 Source: USCG Public Affairs Office, “Coast Guard Interdicts 2 Pangas, 12,000 Pounds of 
Marijuana,” United States Coast Guard Newsroom (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Public Affairs Office, August 1, 2014), http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2217945/Imagery-
available-Coast-Guard-interdicts-2-pangas-12-000-pounds-of-marijuana. 
 24
contributing to over 335,000 drug-related deaths in the same 10-year span.86 These 
overpowering statistics and growth of the drug trade further epitomize the need for 
maritime security combatants in the duel for transit zone dominance.  
B. MARITIME NARCOTIC LEGAL/STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK  
The United States has been at war with narcotics since the late 1980s. The 
ongoing threat of transnational organized crime, trafficking trade, and drug use 
continuously jeopardizes U.S. homeland security and the economy. For this reason, the 
United States made coastal security, interdiction, and drug deterrence a high priority in 
various strategies and policy objectives established by the Department of Defense, 
Department of Homeland Security, and other local and federal law enforcement agencies. 
These missions and blueprints are depicted in a number of sources including the 
president’s 2014 Drug-Control Strategy, the 2015 National Security Strategy, the 2015 
Caribbean Counternarcotics Strategy, U.S. Code 124 of Title 10, the U.S. Navy’s 2015 
Maritime Security Strategy and Naval Operations Concept, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s 
Maritime Homeland Security Strategy.87 In turn, these strategies and directives directly 
aim at the urgency of the U.S. acquiring and possessing adequate maritime patrol frigates 
to conduct these objectives. 
In this section, the flowchart in Figure 5 will aid in demonstrating the 
governmental strategies and directives, which dictate the inherent need for maritime 
patrols and increased frigates and aircraft to complete them. This chart represents a two 
part directional flow diagram for analytical interpretation of the president’s strategies and 
                                                 
86 Figures based on Table 73. Domestic Drug Consumption (Sum of years 2000–2010), Table 53. 
Total Estimated Arrests and Drug Arrests (Total Percentage of Cocaine Arrests between 2000–2010 
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National Drug Control Strategy Data Supplement 2014 (Washington, DC: White House, 2014), 56, 69, 87. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-
research/ndcs_data_supplement_2014.pdf. 
87 White House, The, 2015 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, February 
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf; 2014 
Drug Control Strategy; U.S. Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower; U.S. Navy, Naval 
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Guard Maritime Homeland Security Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S.C.G. Headquarters, 2002), 
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the armed forces strategies/directives to meet the overall goal of eradicating narcotics on 
the high seas. 
  
Figure 5.  Maritime Security Strategic Framework Model 
1. Presidential Strategies: National Security Strategy 
President Obama justifies in his 2015 National Security Strategy that economic 
strength and growth is the basis for maintaining American national security. Based on 
this approach, illegal drug trafficking threatens the safety of the American people and its 
economic growth; we must be exceptionally guarded against terrorism, its associated 
illicit networks, and transnational organized crime regimes, through intensified maritime 
interdiction and border security.88 These close ties of illegal drug trafficking in Latin 
American regions to organized crime, such as money laundering, weapons trafficking, 
human trafficking, spread of corruption, and potential funding of terrorism,89 greatly pose 
                                                 
88 2015 National Security Strategy, 8. 
89 Max Manwaring, U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Columbia, Why Now, and 
What Is to Be Done? (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 7. 
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serious threats to U.S. national and regional stability. As a result, increased law 
enforcement is critical for maintaining security on land and in the maritime realm. 
2. Presidential Strategies: Drug Control Strategy 
The 2014 National Drug Control Strategy provides emphasis and procedures on 
counteracting transnational organized crime and domestic drug usage. Specifically, it 
asserts that Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) use illegal narcotics as primary 
means to gain wealth, power, and influence.90 To combat these TCOs, this strategy 
explicitly states using the maximum allowable federal support and interagency 
collaboration for intelligence sharing and drug interdiction, “Along Drug Trafficking 
Corridors via ‘Gateway/Destination’ initiatives.”91 This advocacy is important because 
TCOs evade traditional land based borders, smuggling metric tons of marijuana and 
cocaine via maritime routes, making conventional land based interdiction problematic. 
Therefore, “targeting bulk shipments of illegal drugs before they reach U.S. borders has 
the greatest effect on reducing their flow toward the U.S.”92 by means of increased 
maritime patrols by frigates and intelligence aircraft. 
3. Presidential Strategies: Caribbean Counternarcotics Strategy  
The Caribbean Counternarcotics Strategy is based upon the Drug Control Strategy 
philosophy of containing drug movement before it hits American soil. This particular 
strategy illustrates the “interdiction continuum” as the procedure for interrupting 
narcotics at the point of entry, or along their scheduled maritime routes (transit zones) by 
virtue of prior evidence and intelligence gathering. United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) and its operational commanders, use this interdiction continuum to 
augment “air and maritime detection and monitoring, interdiction and apprehension, and 
domain awareness capabilities.”93 
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The Interdiction Continuum is a self-sustaining cycle, which requires a great deal 
of interagency cooperation and assets to be successful. Here, DOD and Homeland 
Security agencies use increased air and maritime (frigates) assets for detection/ 
monitoring, interdiction, captures, and maritime dominance against narcotic traffickers.94 
Based on this strategy, U.S. government and law enforcement officials assert that a 
successful continuum is achieved using “Seizures, disruptions, and prosecutions [which] 
produce new intelligence and advance investigations into major transnational criminal 
networks, leading to more actionable intelligence on future events and producing follow 
on seizures.”95 This concept is best illustrated in Figure 6, where each link of the 
continuum chain represents core critical elements for counter-narcotic missions’ 
intelligence and operational effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Interdiction Continuum Chain96 
Intelligence and operational effectiveness rely heavily on maritime patrol frigates 
and air assets. These assets require systematic and precise coordination from their joint 
operations commanders. In turn, coordination enables Cueing, Detection and Monitoring 
(D&M), Interdiction and Apprehension (I&A), and Prosecution to operate seamlessly. 
However, according to the Caribbean Counternarcotics Strategy, this coordination chain 
cannot function properly unless there are adequate maritime patrol vessels and aircraft 
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with enhanced air interdiction capabilities, continued investments in maritime assets/
capabilities, or constant expansion in air and maritime domain awareness.97  
4. Department of Defense/Department of Homeland Security Strategies 
Under Section 124 of Title 10 of the United States Code, the Departments of 
Defense and Homeland Security have critical sections of their maritime security 
objectives specifically designated for using maritime patrol vessels in countering illegal 
narcotic trafficking on the high seas. This section of the legal code specifically states that  
The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the 
Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and 
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Department of 
Defense personnel may [also] operate equipment of the Department to 
intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the United 
States.98 
Based on this law, the DOD is responsible for detection and monitoring of illegal 
trafficking, but the Department of Homeland Security (specifically the Coast Guard) is 
the lead agency for interdiction efforts. Nonetheless, DOD is the secondary agency for 
interdiction and has the authority to use its resources (i.e., frigates) and aircraft for 
interception. In turn, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security delineate their 
efforts and focus on this mission in their strategic frameworks.  
a. U.S. Navy Maritime Security Strategy/Naval Operations Concept 
The DOD achieves the National Security Strategy’s goals throughout its Maritime 
Strategy and Naval Operations Concept in regard to maritime security interdiction. Both 
documents specifically illustrate the military’s role in preserving maritime security, and 
how the military protects U.S. economic interests and sovereignty by promoting the laws, 
rules, and seaborne sanctions that police the maritime trade and transportation domain.99 
Additionally, both documents clearly assert that in order to protect these interests and 
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supremacy, the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a layered defense using patrol 
vessels to achieve and maintain maritime dominance for the, “support of free and open 
seaborne commerce, counter[ing] weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational 
organized crime, piracy, illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful 
seaborne immigration.”100  
b. U.S. Homeland Security/Maritime Security Strategy 
The Department of Homeland Security was established to protect the U.S. 
homeland and its citizens from terrorism and other threats. The DHS’s strategy focuses 
on using all of its resources including: law enforcement, financial influence, intelligence, 
and military assets to deter and disrupt such events from occurring.101 Under DHS’s 
strategic umbrella, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Homeland Security Strategy states 
(with direct assistance and aid of DOD) that the Coast Guard is responsible for all law 
enforcement capabilities in the realm of protecting the U.S. and its adjacent waterways 
from narcotic trafficking.102 Furthermore, this strategy portrays its game plan of 
patrolling these waterways (Drug Transit Zones) in the Eastern Pacific, Caribbean Sea, 
and the Gulf of Mexico, based on these seven principles: 
(1) The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency (LFA) for Maritime 
Homeland Security; (2) the Department of Defense acts primarily as a 
supporting agency to the Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security; 
(3) the Department of Defense acts as the LFA for Maritime Homeland 
Defense, employing traditional military missions, with the Coast Guard 
acting as a supported or supporting commander; (4) securing the homeland 
requires the sharing of responsibilities among agencies; (5) securing the 
homeland also requires unprecedented information sharing by all agencies; 
(6) maritime security operations will be focused to meet essential threat-
based requirements and conducted within the rule of law; and (7) forces 
for implementing this Strategy will be derived by leveraging the Coast 
Guard’s multi-mission assets, by acquiring new resources, and through 
partnering with both public and private stakeholders.103 
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With powerful maritime counternarcotic strategies in place, the United States 
Coast Guard and United States Navy have the abilities to operate effectively as long as 
they have adequate patrol frigates and aircraft available to achieve the objective. 
C. COUNTERNARCOTIC INTERDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS 
Maritime counternarcotic interdiction operations fall under the umbrella of Joint 
Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) and its military command, United States 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). JIATFS is made up of 34 representatives from 15 
different federal and military agencies, and it is deemed the distribution hub for narcotic 
trafficking destined for the U.S.104 JIATF’s mission is to eliminate the primary flow of 
narcotics in and around the joint operating area, and to achieve 100 percent domain 
awareness of all trafficking as a whole.105 Furthermore, JIATFS specifically conducts the 
interagency and intelligence detection/monitoring operations and facilitates interdictions 
of narco-terrorist threats.106  
As a result of JIATFS and SOUTHCOM interdiction efforts, (when interdiction 
assets are available) the amount of cocaine entering the United States has decreased each 
year since 2006.107 When SOUTHCOM and JIATFS have sufficient U.S. Navy frigates 
or Coast Guard cutters on patrol conducting intelligence, detection, and interdiction 
operations, transnational organized crime (TOC) networks move shipments into deeper 
waters of the Eastern Pacific (where they are less successful). Based on this evidence, 
JIATF’s monitoring, detection, and interdiction efforts revealed a decrease of around 45 
metric tons between 2011 and 2012 in the littoral waters around Central America.108 This 
overall steady decrease, FMSO report “Narco-Subs” reports, “Indicates an impact on the 
traffickers caused by the presence of U.S. ships and aircraft, the efforts of our law 
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enforcement partners and those of our allies and partner nations in the region.”109 As 
traffickers look to continue shifting operations to deeper waters, the U.S. Navy becomes 
more valuable for its maritime assets to thwart future threats. 
1. Maritime Counternarcotic Success 
The success of interagency cooperation between U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard 
ships and aircraft in littoral and blue waters has proven critical against the narcotic 
trafficking trade. This is most notable in the success of one particular Countering 
Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) mission, Operation Martillo. Operation Martillo 
encompasses 14 participating countries in the fight against CTOC (Counter Transnational 
Organized Crime) and narcotic trafficking: Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and majority contributor, United States.110 From 2012 until March 
2015, over 400 metric tons of cocaine has been intercepted at sea by the U.S. Navy and 
USCG, worth an estimated $8 billion in secondary markets.111 In fiscal year 2012 and 
2013 alone, U.S. assets interdicted 284 metric tons of cocaine in their sea transit lanes.112  
U.S. involvement in Martillo operations produces results, as assets are available. 
For example, the USCG seized 25 metric tons of cocaine from 24 trafficking vessels and 
two bale recoveries between July and November of 2015 totaling $765 million in street 
value.113 In addition, U.S. forces were successful in interdicting 27 narco-subs between 
2005 and 2013, using their imposing air and maritime assets.114 But, present day 
interdiction operations are sharply declining as a result of reduced U.S. Navy maritime 
and air assets. Severe budget constraints and decommissioned ships have hindered these 
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U.S. led efforts to the point where U.S. Coast Guard assets cannot keep up with the 
workload nor does the Coast Guard obtain the budget required for these missions. In turn, 
the trafficking trade goes unscathed because there is more intelligence available than 
there are forces available for interception.115 
D. BUDGET SHORTFALLS AND NEED FOR MORE ASSETS 
Severe reduction in interdiction missions and success is a direct result of the loss 
of U.S. Navy ships and aircraft assets. These U.S. Navy platforms, dubbed by 
SOUTHCOM officials as “invaluable to the region’s security,”116 have been critical in 
counter-narcotics operations. The effectiveness of Operation Martillo and other oceanic 
interdiction missions is now diminished because of the decommissioning of the entire 
Oliver Hazard Perry frigate fleet at the end of 2015.117 Additionally, the Perry frigate’s 
replacement, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), is slated for other missions because of great 
demand in the Asian and Middle Eastern regions.118 In 2013, Rear Admiral Sinclair M 
Harris, Commander of U.S. Fourth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces SOUTHCOM, spoke 
about this problem, claiming that, 
When the U.S. Navy (USN) re-established the U.S. Fourth Fleet in 2008, 
it was part of an effort to revitalize its support to U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) with ship and air assets for maritime security operations, 
drug interdiction, theatre security co-operation, and humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief (HADR) missions in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
However, five years on, U.S. budget cuts have forced the USN to reduce 
ship deployments to the region…the ship deficit is driving the 
commander… to re-examine the future and to figure out ways to bridge 
the gap in the near-term.119 
In FY2013 alone, budget sequestration had a compelling impact on interdiction 
missions for SOUTHCOM and JIATF. During that time, much of USCG and U.S. Navy 
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assets training, operating, and maintenance funds were cut significantly.120 Over the past 
three years, the DOD (Navy) and DHS (USCG) budget cuts represent a drastic decrease 
for DOD, and a steady decrease for DHS. Table 2 represents the decrease in budgeting 
from FY2013 to FY2015 for both agencies’ anti-narcotic operations and assets. 
Table 2.   Budget Authority for Counternarcotics Resources121 
 
 
Harsh budget cuts and lack of defense official’s willingness to back the drug 
interdiction mission has damaged America’s homeland security By virtue of slim to no 
maritime vessels and air assets, JIATF and SOUTHCOM are incapable of targeting three 
quarters of possible interdiction operations identified by their intelligence teams.122 Of 
the 1,426 maritime known narcotic shipments in FY2014, JIATF-South was only able to 
take action on 383 (27 percent) of them due to reduced availability of ship and air 
assets.123 Furthermore, in February 2015, the USCG Commandant revealed to the 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation that his agency was only 
able to interdict 20 percent of the known narcotics being transported in drug Transit 
Zones because of severe lack of assets.124 One step further, in 2014’s FMSO report on 
“Narco-Subs,” it states that the DOD’s detection and monitoring assets are scarce as well, 
arguing that, “Currently, we are unable to target 74 percent of high confidence events. Of 
the 26 percent that we are able to target the principle impediment to successful detection 
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and monitoring, is the lack of necessary sensors to generate persistent wide area 
surveillance and precision geo-location.”125 
High volumes of maritime patrol vessels play a critical role in maintaining the 
high levels of maritime security called for in U.S. government strategies. Moreover, these 
patrol vessels are essential in covering the seven million mile area of drug transit zones. 
On May 22, 2013, then JIATF Commander Rear Admiral Charles Michel argued at a 
Defense Writers Group event that, “The joint operating area the task force patrols is 
about 12 times the size of the continental United States, encompassing the entire 
continent of South America as well as Central America, Mexico and the water spaces 
surrounding the region… [This] task force has just three to four ships and four to five 
aircraft to cover that entire area.”126 Furthermore, based on this tremendous amount of 
ocean to cover, on March 12, 2015, SOUTHCOM’s Commander General John Kelly 
supported this notion before the Senate Armed Services Committee, arguing that to have 
successful seaborne interdiction missions, “It takes 16 flight-deck equipped ships to meet 
the mission needs in the Transit Zones.”127 Flight deck enabled ships have the capability 
to launch U.S. Navy or USCG helicopters for surveillance, tracking, and support of 
boarding teams on the surface. 
Numerous circumstances have affected the ability of JIATF and SOUTHCOM to 
achieve successful anti-narcotic interdictions, from traffickers changing their posture, 
tactics, and seaborne lanes, to the inability to produce actionable intelligence. 
Nonetheless, the problem most impeding prosecution of known narcotic shipments is the 
lack of surface interdiction vessels.128 To comply with official maritime and narcotic 
strategies/missions regarding narcotic interdiction on the high seas, it is imperative for 
the U.S. government to appropriate, fund, and build the replacement for the Oliver 
Hazard Perry Frigate’s role in maritime interdiction operations. Its renounced 
replacement, the Littoral Combat Ship, is in line to fill big shoes and the hole left behind 
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by its predecessors in the maritime interdiction realm. The billion-dollar question is: 
Does the LCS have the capability of fulfilling the maritime security combatant 
requirement its older brother filled for over 30 plus years?  
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IV. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP—SHIP OF THE FUTURE 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was once lauded as the future of the U.S. Navy’s 
surface warfare fleet. The LCS program’s pure objective was to provide inexpensive, 
stealthy, and modular small combatants to operate in the littorals, or close to the coast, 
using a shallow draft and high speed capabilities, in conjunction with multi-mission 
packages and launching unmanned vehicles (UV’s).129 The ship was intended to leverage 
advances in technology to minimize crew size, maximize its functionality by employing 
different mission packages, and use water jets to increase maneuverability without 
sacrificing speed. However, the program encountered immense design problems and 
concept limitations that brought it under scrutiny and possible eradication. 
A. HISTORY OF LCS: WARGAME-CONCEPT-REALITY 
During the mid-1990s, as the Cold War was ramping down, a series of war games 
yielded the birth of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept. The key game was the Joint 
Multi-warfare Analytical Game (JMAG), centered on what Captain Robert Carney 
Powers described as “the developmental cutting edge of modeling, simulation, and a 
‘decision-maker in the loop’ process.”130 Based on this war game model, the Navy used a 
decision making process to develop a central concept based on new and emerging 
technical platforms such as unmanned aerial, underwater, and surface vehicles, mine 
countermeasure systems, ship concepts, as well as system and weapon concepts as they 
pertained to an external threat in the littorals (shallower coastal waters).131 This process 
used computer models in various scenarios to compare these competing systems and 
platforms in their ability to work simultaneously with each other in futuristic conflicts.132 
The result was the development of a maritime platform, capable of employing various 
manned and unmanned systems quickly and swiftly. For this reason, the LCS program 
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did not begin like traditional ship platforms where the platform is developed and then is 
evaluated for the use in battle; rather, the LCS platform/program was built based on 
emerging futuristic scenarios.133 
Based on the criteria conceptualized from the JMAG war game series, the 
understanding was that during maritime joint operations, the Littoral Combat Ship would 
eliminate the inconsistent proficiencies within the littoral Mine Countermeasure (MCM), 
littoral Surface Warfare (SUW) and littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) areas.134 
These ships were to be an expendable fleet composed of numerous small, less expensive 
ships so that if one were lost in battle, only a small portion of the Navy’s aggregate 
combat power was lost.135 Their original design expectations were that they would be the 
size of a WWII destroyer (2,222-2,600 ton displacement), able to deploy individually 
with an extended range exceeding 3,000 nautical miles, have a shallow draft, contain 
stealth-like features to reduce radar signature, be helicopter capable, and capable of 
reaching 50 knots in speed.136  
1. Mission Need for LCS 
The need for a new stealth-like surface combatant capable of reaching high speeds 
and launching a helicopter emerged from defense leaders, questioning: what mission are 
these vessels critical for? The new LCS mission, detailed by defense leaders, quoted and 
illustrated that 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be optimized for flexibility in the 
littorals as a system of systems that are both manned and unmanned, 
mission reconfigurable, and deployed in LCS. It will focus on three 
primary anti-access mission areas: Littoral Surface Warfare operations 
emphasizing prosecution of small boats, mine warfare, and littoral 
antisubmarine warfare. Its high speed and ability to operate at economical 
loiter speeds will enable fast and calculated response to small boat threats, 
mine laying and quiet diesel submarines. LCS employment of networked 
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sensors for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in 
support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) will directly enhance littoral 
mobility. Its shallow draft will allow easier excursion into shallower areas 
for both mine countermeasures and small boat prosecution. Using LCS 
against these asymmetric threats will enable Joint Commanders to 
concentrate multi-mission combatants on primary missions such as 
precision strike, battle group escort and theater air defense.137 
In particular, the Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Warfare areas of the LCS will 
provide a “first response” mine hunting capability which includes the ability to detect, 
localize, classify, identify and neutralize in deep water through the beach zone.138 Here 
the vessels are necessary to allow forces to maneuver safely through a potentially mined 
area in a timely manner and provide mine cleared areas for transit, sea lines of 
communication and large operating groups. For Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), the 
LCS will fill the need to locate, identify, and prosecute adversarial submarines. This 
protects Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) by 
establishing ASW barriers and aiding in escorting of High Value Units (HVU) in and 
around established areas of responsibility.139  
Finally, in Surface Warfare (SUW) the LCS will detect, classify and neutralize 
attacking small craft. This is necessary to protect larger naval forces transiting through 
potentially hostile choke points and conducting operations in or around the littorals.140 
Particularly, these small ships were expected to, “relieve highly capable ships of the need 
to perform such tasks as maritime interdiction operations that made poor use of their 
considerable potential combat power and stretched the current fleet thin.”141 Thus, the 
LCS was slated to replace the successful Oliver Hazard Perry Frigates’ mission load of 
countering maritime narcotics trafficking and other multi mission objectives in coastal 
waters worldwide. 
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B. LCS PLATFORMS: SHIPS OF THE FUTURE 
Like most new defense platform concepts in the United States military, LCS 
designers developed two different platforms for a series of tests to decide which platform 
would roll into production. On May 27, 2004, the U.S. Navy awarded manufacturers—
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics— to design and produce one prototype (with an 
option to build one more).142 In turn, each manufacturer produced two completely 
different prototype designs—the Lockheed Martin (Freedom Class) design is a monohull 
design featuring a steel hull and aluminum superstructure, while the General Dynamics’ 
(Independence Class) design features an all-aluminum trimaran hull. In addition, both 
ship designs are built in separate shipyards, and feature two completely different 
engineering systems and combat systems suites containing various models and versions 
of sensors, computers, displays and software patches.143 In November 2010, in lieu of 
proclaiming a manufacturing design victor, the Navy approached Congress for 
permission to build 10 vessels of both designs.144 
1. Freedom Class (LCS -1) 
The Freedom class (LCS-1) Littoral Combat Ship’s design incorporates 
traditional ship building techniques with newer stealth technology. The LCS-1 class uses 
the same design structure utilized on the Oliver Hazard Perry frigate by incorporating a 
steel hull (for increased strength) with an aluminum superstructure to reduce weight. 
Though its monohull design, illustrated on the USS Freedom in Figure 7, is similar to 
traditional ship designs, its sharp angle characteristics and less protruding sensors differ 
from those designs to reduce its radar signature.  
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Figure 7.  USS Freedom (LCS 1)145 
Additionally, the ship spans 378.3 feet in length, has a beam of 57.4 feet, and a 
staggering shallow draft of 13.5 feet.146 To complement its relatively small size, its 
engineering plant uses a Combined Diesel and Gas (CODAG) propulsion system—
powered by twin Rolls Royce MT-30 gas turbine engines (96,500 HP), in addition to twin 
Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 16PA6B diesel engines (17,160 HP).147 Using this hybrid 
propulsion system, the ship is propelled through the water using four Rolls Royce 
Kameawa 153SII water jets, enabling the Freedom to operate on either gas turbine or 
diesel engines at a maximum of 40 plus knots.148 In addition to its high-powered 
engineering plant, Table 3 illustrates the Freedom class’ armament and sensors (without a 
specified module): 
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Table 3.   Freedom Class (LCS-1) Ship Specifications149 
 
 
2. Independence Class 
The Independence class (LCS-2) Littoral Combat Ship design completely shies 
from traditional shipbuilding techniques, design, and construction. This particular sea 
frame, like the USS Independence illustrated in Figure 8, is based on a trimaran hull used 
on the Fred Olsen Line of fast commercial ferries, in order to reduce water friction and 
increase speed.150 This design also incorporates a large flight deck for operations with 
heavy-lift helicopters. Unlike the Freedom class LCS, the Independence class hull and 
superstructure are composed entirely of aluminum—reducing weight; yet, sacrificing 
strength and durability. 
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Power Plant
CODAG: 2 Rolls Royce M T-30 gas turbines (96,550 hp); 2 Fairbanks M orse Colt-Pielst ick 16PA6B 
diesels (17,160 hp)
4 Rolls Royce Waterjets
Leng t h 378.3 Feet
B eam 57.4 Feet
D isp lacement 3,360 tons (Full Load)
Speed 40 Plus Knots (Classif ied)
R ang e 3,500 Nautical miles at  14Kts
A ircraf t 1 M H-60 Seahawk Helicopter or 2 Firescout VTUAV's 
C rew Size 50 Crew M embers (Est imated)
A rmament
SAM : 1 Ratheyon RAM  RIM -116 21-Cell M K 99 launcher
SSM : Lockheed M Art in Longbow Apache Hellf ire (AGM  114L)
1 BAE Systems 57mm/M K110 Gun
(4) 12.7 mm M achine Guns
C o mb at  Syst ems
Lockheed M art in COM BATSS-21
2 Terma SKWS Decoy Launching Systems
ESM : Argon ST WBR 2000 Electronic Countermeasures
EADS TRS-3D Air and Surface Search Radar
Sperry Bridgemaster Navigat ion Radar
FABA DORNA TV/IR Fire Control Radar
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Figure 8.  USS Independence (LCS 2)151 
These vessels span 421 feet in length; their beam at the widest breadth is an astounding 
103.7 feet, and they have a shallow draft of 14.6 feet.152 Powering this wide aluminum 
vessel, the Independence class utilizes a CODAG propulsion system much like its 
Freedom class counterpart; however, it packs two of its predecessor’s (Oliver Hazard 
Perry frigate) LM2500 gas turbine engines (59,005 HP) in conjunction with two MTU 
20V 8000 diesels (25,748 HP), thus propelling it to speeds in excess of 50 knots.153 
Additionally, Table 4 illustrates the Independence class’ armament and sensors (without a 
specified module): 
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Table 4.   Independence Class (LCS-2) Ship Specifications154 
 
C. MODULAR TECHNOLOGY: MISSION MODULES 
The LCS was conceptualized to be modular, especially considering its speed and 
capability to get in and out of a fight. This modular concept is intended for the LCS 
platform to incorporate the “plug and play” mentality, allowing the specific vessel to pull 
into port, swap out its warfare mission module in one to four days, and head out to sea for 
its follow-on mission.155 These modules, using substantial “manned and unmanned off-
board systems,”156 encompass three exclusive mission packages: the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) module, the Mine-Countermeasure (MCM) module, and the Surface 
Warfare (SUW) module. Each module consists of various weapons, sub platforms 
(vehicles), aircraft, additional sensors, and personnel that enable the ship to complete its 
specified mission.157 
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Power Plant
CODAG: 2 GE LM 2500 gas turbines (59,005 hp); 2 M TU 20V 8000 diesels (25,748 hp)
4 LIPS  Steerable Waterjets; 1 Steerable Thruster
Length 421.6 Feet
Beam 103.7 Feet
Displacement 3,188 (Full Load)
Speed 50 Plus Knots (Classif ied)
Range 3,500 Nautical miles at  14Kts
Aircraft 2 M H-60 Seahawk Helicopters or 2 Firescout VTUAV's 
Crew Size 40 Crew M embers (Est imated)
Armament
SAM : 1 Ratheyon SeaRAM  RIM -116ab 11-Cell launcher
SSM : Lockheed M Art in Longbow Apache Hellf ire (AGM  114L)
1 BAE Systems 57mm/M K110 Gun
(4) 12.7 mm M achine Guns
Combat Systems
Northrup Gruman Electronic Systems Integrated Combat M anagement System (ICM S)
Decoys: 4 Loral/Hycor SRBOC 6-barreled f ixed launchers
ESM : Exelis ES-3601
AN/SPS-77 (Saab Sea Giraf fe AM B) 3D Air/Surface Search Radar
Sperry Bridgemaster Navigat ion Radar
Seastar Saf ire III Optronic Director Fire Control System/Radar
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1. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Module 
The ASW mission module furnishes Joint Force Commanders the opportunity to 
utilize “detect-to-engage” capabilities in the fight against modern enemy diesel-electric 
and nuclear submarines within coastal waters.158 The U.S. Navy contends that such, 
“specific ASW capabilities include protecting forces in transit, protecting joint operating 
areas, and establishing ASW barriers.”159 In turn, this module encompasses variable 
depth sonar, a multi-function towed array, launching and recovery equipment for both 
sonar systems, signal processing systems, torpedo defense module, MH-60R Helicopter 
w/ALFS, and a Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.160	
2. Mine-Countermeasure (MCM) Module 
The MCM module is designed to provide Joint Force Commanders the ability to 
detect and subdue enemy minefields for safe passage of maritime shipping and transit. 
While the LCS platform sits out of range of enemy minefields, the mine countermeasures 
package deploys, “various aviation assets and unmanned surface, semi-submersible and 
submersible vehicles that together are equipped with an array of sensors and systems to 
detect, localize, neutralize and, sweep mines.”161 This package utilizes various manned 
and unmanned aircraft/vehicles within its sub-modules: the Remote Minehunting 
Module, the Near Surface Detection Module, the Airborne Mine Neutralization Module, 
the Coastal Mine Reconnaissance Module, the Unmanned Mine Sweeping Module, and 
the Buried Mine Hunting Module for detection and destruction of enemy mines.162 
3. Surface Warfare (SUW) Module 
The SUW module is designed to give Joint Force Commanders the ability to 
combat small boat threats, and supports maritime security operations. This module is 
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specifically intended for counternarcotics interdiction missions, as well combating 
against terrorists and high seas piracy.163 This module, the Navy argues, “augments the 
core Littoral Combat Ship sensor and weapons capabilities with gun, missile, and 
aviation systems, providing a layered defense capable of rapidly detecting, tracking, and 
prosecuting small boat threats.”164 In the fight against small boat threats and maritime 
counternarcotics missions, the SUW module deploys: a Gun Mission Module containing 
a MK 46 Gun Weapon System with MK 44 MOD 2 30mm Automatic Cannon; a 
Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM) containing a Longbow Hellfire surface-to-
surface missile system; an Aviation Module containing a MH-60R Helicopter, MK299 
MOD 2 launchers with 8 Hellfire missiles, GAU21 .50 caliber machine gun, M240 
7.62mm machine gun, and a Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; and a Maritime 
Security Module containing two 11m Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) with cradles 
and parts; Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) gear, and Boarding teams.165 
4. Mission Module Cost 
The mission module technology is complicated in terms of cost and budget. 
According to the 2014 Government Accountability Office report, Defense Acquisitions: 
Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs, the LCS program office projected the total 
number of mission module packages to be approximately $7.24 billion.166 However, this 
evaluation fails to account for any modifications to the modules that occurred from the 
LCS program’s restructure in 2014.167 Furthermore, an actual clear-cut price for each 
module has not been established. Instead as Congressional Research Service reports 
indicate, “The estimated Average Production Unit Cost (APCU) for all 59 OPN-funded 
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mission packages…is $68.9 million in Constant Year (CY) Fiscal Year 2010 dollars. This 
is the most accurate answer for ‘How much does it cost to buy a mission package?’”168 
Based on this assumption, the U.S. Navy estimates that the 59 mission modules are 
broken down into: 23 MCM modules at $97.7 million per unit, 21 SUW modules at $32.6 
million per unit, 15 ASW modules at $20.9 million per unit, and 59 sets of the Common 
Mission Package Equipment at $14.8 million per unit. Though these estimates appear to 
establish consistent costs for the modules, their future price tags are unclear. 
D. LCS BUDGET ACQUISITION AND COST: DUAL AWARD-BLOCK BUY 
STRATEGY 
The LCS program’s budget and acquisition techniques (like those of its mission 
modules) are new. Upon completion of Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics’ 
development contracts for the initial Freedom class and Independence class platforms, in 
September of 2009, Congress approved a “Down Select” acquisition strategy for the new 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS’s 1-4). Under this plan, the Navy would purchase four of each 
of the Freedom and Independence Class variants, conduct a testing phase, and decide on 
which variant would win the 52-ship procurement.169 However, in November of 2010, the 
Navy convinced Congress to switch to a “Dual Award” strategy, procuring ten of each of 
the two proposed variants (LCS’s 5-24) in a “Block Buy” format. Here, each shipbuilder 
would produce “x” number of platforms at the same price (per unit) allotted in that fiscal 
year’s (FY) funding request, which also included a unit procurement cap for inflation 
purposes.170 The Navy believed that shifting to a Dual Award program would sustain 
marketplace competition, increase the rate of procurement, decrease (per unit) costs, and 
that the strategy provided the ability to produce a variety of options for foreign military 
sales.171  
Based on the Dual Award program with a block buy strategy, the Navy is 
operating on an incremental approach when purchasing LCS platforms. Here, blocks of 
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ships are procured according to adjustments made to structural and technological changes 
in the platform. Hence, in FY2010 when the block-buy strategy was awarded, the Navy 
determined that each vessel built had a target price of $440 million and a ceiling (cap) 
price of $538 million per unit for that block’s fiscal year. For example, if the vessel’s cost 
exceeded the target price of that fiscal years’ (per unit) cost, the overage cost was shared 
by the Navy and the contractor (builder); however, if the unit cost exceeded the ceiling 
(cap) price, that coverage was fully absorbed by the contractor.172 Based on this notion, 
the President’s recent budget request of FY2016 shows the Navy requested to build three 
LCS’s in FY16 at a total cost of $1,640.1 Million ($479 Million per unit).173 In each of 
the 4 subsequent years, the Navy is requesting: FY 2017 $1,787.7 Million (3 units, 503.4 
per unit); FY2018 $1,759.8 Million (3 units, 514.7 per unit); FY2019 $1,492.9 Million (3 
units, 636.7 per unit); and FY2020 $1,856.5 Million (2 units, 578 per unit).174 
The goal of the dual award program on a block buy strategy was to decrease 
production cost per each unit/vessel. From the beginning, U.S. Naval leaders vowed that 
the new LCS class ships would be approximately $220 million to build; however, by 
2007 that estimate had grown to over $375 million.175 In turn, after the initial cost of LCS 
1 thru 4, Congress agreed to adjust the target and ceilings of the program. This change 
was necessary due to the cost increases from change orders, but the intended efficiency in 
production from two manufacturers quickly faded with the addition of a need for a new 
version of the LCS.176 Moreover, increases to expand the lethality of the baseline ship 
without a mission module and to increase its survivability caused the average cost to rise 
from $464 million per ship to $473 million per ship.177 Thus, according to the Navy’s 
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budget submission, the overall cost per ship is rising more dramatically over the next four 
years than predicted, and is projected to exceed the contracted ceiling price. In turn, the 
total cost of the program, per ship average through FY2020, is projected to be $571.3 
million per ship. This represents a $67.4 Million per ship over budget analysis, or $2.683 
billion total over budget in the program. 
E. PROGRAM ISSUES AND SETBACKS 
The LCS program continues to endure strict criticisms based on their ever-
increasing cost growth and design complications. As Gregory V. Cox argues, “The Navy 
writ large lacked a coherent vision for the LCS. Without clearly articulating what the 
vessel was supposed to do, the conflicting visions of survivability, lethality, modularity, 
speed, and manpower remained.”178 Even after the first two vessels were built and 
commissioned, there were extreme complications with the platforms. Construction and 
testing found that these vessels were very susceptible to corrosion, steering problems, and 
their inability to locate mines.179 This section illustrates the underachieving LCS 
platforms and their continuous complications with reduced manning and sub-par 
survivability/lethality. 
1. Reduced Manning: No Accountability 
The LCS relies heavily on sophisticated technology and automated equipment to 
fulfill normal day-to-day missions and evolutions. At the expense of this technology, 
designer’s reduced the amount of manning (crew size) required to run equipment and 
perform those duties of traditional ships. Their initial plans required only 40 sailors to 
man the entire crew; however, that number quickly grew to over 50 in a short amount of 
time.180 In addition to the ship’s crew, another 38 sailors were needed to embark the 
aircraft detachment and mission module.181 This brought the grand total of approximately 
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88 sailors; whereas, traditional “frigate type” ships require approximately 200 plus.182 
This appeared like a well-planned concept for the LCS; however, as a result of this 
considerable reduced manning instead of sailors performing most repairs and 
maintenance like those on traditional ships, these platforms were built to rely on 
contractors for maintenance and repairs.183 In turn, there is little to no accountability for 
equipment, and often sailors are correcting mistakes made by contractor’s repairs.184 
2. Survivability and Lethality: LCS Cannot Sustain a Fight 
Unlike the requirements of traditional larger combatants, the LCS platforms were 
not designed with unique features to sustain survivability in high-intensity combat 
situations and continue to carry out their mission.185 Rather, these vessels were designed 
to have a “high ratio of lethality-to-survivability…In other words, modest survivability 
was acceptable to those espousing that vision.”186 Situated on this vision, the Navy 
developed the LCS on what they standardize as a Level 1+ survivability rating based on a 
three level survivability-rating scale.187 According to Navy standards, surface ships are 
designed based on one of three survivability ratings: Level I (low) vessels are mine 
warfare ships, patrol craft, and support ships; Level II (moderate) vessels are frigates, 
amphibious ships, and specialized resupply ships; Level III (high) vessels are aircraft 
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.188 The LCS designer’s concept was that they would be 
above current patrol craft (PC) and minesweeper (MCM) ships’ Level I survivability 
rating, yet less than the (Oliver Hazard Perry it replaced) frigates’ Level II rating.189  
In 2014, the U.S. Navy announced the LCS program’s mission effectiveness on 
survivability and lethality upon completion of a (SUW) Surface Warfare mission package 
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operational test aboard the Freedom Class LCS Platform. In turn, the Navy deemed the 
vessel capable of meeting the required lethal capability; however, their reports claimed 
that the platform did not fulfill an array of specifications.190 Moreover, the Department of 
Defense’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation team quoted:  
There is insufficient data to provide statistical confidence that LCS can 
meet its lethality requirements in future testing or operations… The Navy 
also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability 
requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments 
until 2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under 
construction.191  
Based on the immense concern of these additional survivability assessments, the biggest 
issue facing the program is the unknown outcome of the Independence class’ aluminum 
hull in combat situations. Though the Freedom Class LCS was deemed effectively 
survivable, the Navy is unsure how the Independence will fare against an underwater 
explosion.192 Even during sea trials in 2010, the Independence sustained considerable 
damage to its hull during rough sea conditions.193 
Six years after the contractor’s delivery of the lead Freedom and Independence 
class hulls, their lethality and survivability are of extreme concern. Since those deliveries, 
the Navy has decreased numerous survivability and lethality requirements, as well as 
designers and contractors have truncated several design features, “making the ship both 
less survivable in its expected threat environments and less lethal than initially 
planned.”194 In turn, the Navy is restructuring how the ship plans to operate on reduced 
capabilities. 
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On March 4, 2015, Secretary of the Navy Ray Maybus briefed Congress and 
lawmakers on potential and expected survivability and lethality upgrades to LCS 
platforms in response to former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s February 2014 
decision to restructure the LCS program for development of a new small surface 
combatant.195 This brief identifies that, beginning with FY 2019 construction ships 
through LCS hull number 32, will undergo extensive survivability and lethality upgrades, 
adding that the proposed modifications would cost an additional $65-$70 million (20 
percent of the actual cost of the ship) to the original ship price for those upgrades.196 
Furthermore, based on Secretary Hagel’s announcement for the LCS restructure, Maybus 
stated that, 
I am concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve 
its long-term goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract 
negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward…The LCS was designed to 
perform certain missions—such as mine sweeping and anti-submarine 
warfare—in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely 
examine whether the LCS has the independent protection and firepower to 
operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary and 
emerging technologies…Additionally, at my discretion, the Navy will 
submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface 
combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.197 
Based on this direction, it is evident that the LCS program has not lived up to its 
expectations and though it continues to display ongoing complications, the 24 LCS ships 
currently under contract are still being pushed into service to fulfill important roles in the 
Navy force structure.  
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V. ANALYSIS: OHP FFG 7 VS. LCS 
The United States Department of Defense uses specific attributes to delineate 
effective criteria in weapon systems, tactics, training, and other military functions. Based 
on this approach, the DoD uses various measures of effectiveness to determine if those 
criterions are met based on “results achieved in the overall mission and execution of 
assigned tasks.”198  Those criteria measures must meet or exceed three basic qualities: 
Validity, Reliability, and Practicality.199 Validity demonstrates whether the system does 
what it is intended to do, reliability determines whether the system has been proven, and 
practicality measures whether the system is worth the associated price tag.200 This section 
will examine if the Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate or the LCS class ships meet the DOD’s 
criterion requirements as an effective maritime security combatant, and also determine 
which class of combatant is best suited for production in the maritime counternarcotics 
mission. 
A. OLIVER HAZARD PERRY VALIDITY: DOES IT DO WHAT IT IS 
INTENDED TO DO? 
The Perry class frigate rarely carried out its primary mission capabilities in Anti-
Submarine Warfare and Air Defense; yet, it was indispensable in conducting maritime 
security operations. It was not that these vessels could not perform the certain tasks of 
anti-submarine warfare or air defense; rather, they were rarely in the position to perform 
such missions. Once the Perry’s primary role shifted to the maritime counternarcotics 
mission, this class excelled at eradicating the maritime drug trade, especially between 
2012-2015, serving as the predominate interdiction vessels and capturing 400 metric tons 
of cocaine.201  
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The Perry class has capabilities that other smaller patrol craft do not possess. This 
frigate has the perfect size, weight, speed, weaponry, and aircraft deployment for the 
mission of countering the narcotic trade. As naval reports assert, “Global reach from 
these frigates completing this type of mission has proven to have positive effects for 
multinational relationships as well as national defense by slowing the flow of illegal 
drugs into the United States.”202 Furthermore, slowing the flow of these illegal narcotics 
on missions such as the successful counternarcotics deployment of the USS Rodney M. 
Davis (FFG 60) in 2009 where it intercepted over 24 tons of cocaine and three tons of 
marijuana,203 demonstrates the Perry class’ combined validity to launch helicopters and 
UAV patrols, their speed in intercepting traffickers, and the robustness of their platforms 
while performing as a maritime security surface combatant.  
B. OHP’s RELIABILITY: HAS IT PROVEN ITSELF? 
The Perry class frigate’s multirole platform was designed and built to be cheap 
and dispensable after a 15-20 year service life. But the vessel’s robust and battle-tested 
hulls proved their capabilities in excess of 30 plus years. Serving as protectors of 
shipping, oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, and recently eradicating narcotics bound for 
the United States, the Perry class established an unparalleled reputation as one of the top 
surface combatants. These vessels reduced the need for larger operational combatants 
need to break away from normal operations to perform unconventional missions such as 
counternarcotics operations and humanitarian efforts. Kit Bonner writes that the Perry 
class, “Has supported Coast Guard operations against illegal drugs in the Eastern Pacific 
and Caribbean; embarked inspections teams for suspicious vessels in the Arabian Gulf; 
enforced economic sanctions; acted as escorts for tankers, and just been available for 
virtually every task the nation asked of it.”204 This workhorse class exemplified the 
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textbook role of a patrol combatant and their extended commitment to the maritime 
counternarcotics mission. 
C. OHP’s PRACTICALITY: IS IT WORTH THE ASSOCIATED PRICE 
TAG? 
On the basis of delivering great products on time and under budget, the Perry 
class frigate program became the model program for future shipbuilding.205 Though the 
platform suffered setbacks (like many weapons systems do) during the design and 
production phase, the Perry’s final $194 million price tag206 remained a fraction of its 
larger destroyer and cruiser counterparts, giving the Navy the ability to build in mass 
quantities. Furthermore, experts convey,  
The FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates comprise an interesting 
defense procurement case study. The ships are widely touted as a 
successful example of cost containment and escaping “requirements 
creep” —both of which have been major weaknesses in U.S. Navy 
acquisition. The result was a capable 3600-4100 ton anti-submarine 
platform, with secondary air defense and anti-ship capabilities.207  
As a result, the Perrys were resilient, malleable, and surpassed any expectations that their 
original designers envisioned.208 These relatively inexpensive combatants remained 
highly vigilant and valuable to the current maritime security geopolitical situation, and 
thus, demonstrated that the price was worth the overall gain. 
D. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP VALIDITY: DOES IT DO WHAT IT WAS 
INTENDED TO DO? 
The LCS concept, to date, has not successfully demonstrated its platform’s 
intended mission capabilities. The steady struggle with the platform’s survivability, 
robustness, manning, maintenance, and mission modules raises doubts for Congress, 
engineers, and the crewman who serve aboard them. The issue with the LCS program is 
that the combatant’s capabilities and mission sets are consistently based on promises 
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from their designers. As reports show, “Supporters herald the ship type’s advantages. But 
eight years after construction began on the first ship, one inarguable fact remains—no 
LCS has yet been sent on a mission for which it was designed.”209  
The LCS’s designed capability to incorporate the “plug and play” mentality 
regarding its mission modules is failing. The Freedom and Independence class platforms 
(in concept) were supposed to have the capability to interchangeably deploy three 
mission modules: SUW, ASW, and MCM. However, the SUW and ASW packages have 
never been tested or produced for the Independence class (LCS 2) variant, and the MCM 
package has never been tested aboard the Freedom class (LCS 1) variant.210 Only the 
SUW package aboard the Freedom variant platform has successfully demonstrated 
mission modules’ designed parameters during its 2010 deployment to the Caribbean.211 
Additionally, during operational tests of the ASW module for the Freedom class, 
engineers discovered that the module’s package is five tons too large for operations or 
placement within the ship’s stowage space.212 Based on this information and because 
both LCS variants cannot operate each of the mission modules, it is accurate to assess 
that the LCS in its 12-year development and testing phase has not proven its validity per 
its designed mission and capabilities.  
E. LCS RELIABILITY: HAS IT PROVEN ITSELF? 
The LCS program in its entirety is not proven. The problems involved in 
planning, developing, and constructing both LCS variants continue to prevent 
development of a replacement frigate in the U.S. Navy fleet force structure. As 
previously stated, the LCS program has only completed one deployment type mission 
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(aboard the Freedom class variant) where it was deemed effective. Other missions and 
routine testing have proven unsatisfactory. 
In recent events, the LCS has suffered multiple failures with its engineering and 
propulsion systems. Additionally, designers recently canceled testing and production of 
the unmanned Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV),213 which has been in 
development and testing since the beginning of the program. The engineering failures 
occurred aboard the new USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) during its transit from the shipyard in 
Marinette, Wisconsin. The Milwaukee had to completely lock its shafts/propellers (stop 
propulsion) as a result of multiple alarms and issues to its combining gear, leaving the 
vessel dead in the water.214 The combining gear, according to engineers, is “the complex 
gearing that links the output of the ships’ Rolls Royce MT-30 gas turbine engines with its 
Colt-Pielstick diesel engines and then to the ships shafts that drive the water jets.”215 
Furthermore, a couple weeks after the Milwaukee’s incident, its sister ship USS Fort 
Worth (LCS 3), suffered similar issues with its combined gear, sidelining it indefinitely in 
Singapore until repairs are made.216 Yet, even more troubling, prior to these two 
incidents, in January 2016 the USS Freedom LCS 1 (lead ship in its class) suffered 
combining gear issues during a shipyard period.217 These engineering issues along with 
unproven mission modules show that the LCS has been unreliable both in combat 
situation and day-to-day operations.  
F. LCS PRACTICALITY: IS IT WORTH THE ASSOCIATED PRICE TAG? 
The LCS program and its dual award block buy strategy were intended to increase 
marketplace competition. Having two different variants built at two different shipyards 
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was supposed to drive down the overall price of LCS ships. Benefits raised by the Navy 
in 2010 for shifting to a Dual Award program were sustaining marketplace competition, 
an increase in rate of procurement, a drop in per unit costs, and the ability to produce a 
variety of options for foreign military sales. However, the price has risen from its initial 
$220 million price tag to nearly $600 million (not including its mission modules) per ship 
under the Dual Award program,218 and there have been zero military sales or any interest 
in the vessels outside of the U.S. Furthermore, the two shipyard’s existing infrastructures 
were supposed to enable faster production, but neither has been able to keep up with the 
Navy’s inventory strategy. As a result the USS Coronado (LCS-4) was delivered six 
months behind schedule, and U.S. naval leaders expect a serious delay in the next seven 
ships.219  
With the ongoing problems of the LCS program and its inability to prove its 
concept, mission modules, survivability issues, or daily ship operations, it is controversial 
that the Navy continues to procure these vessels. As congressional reports identify,  
The Navy continues to procure LCS frames, even though the sub-systems 
necessary to meet full mission package requirements have not yet been 
fully developed, demonstrated, and integrated with either seaframe class. 
Integrating these systems on the LCS seaframe is challenging because of 
limitations on space and weight inherent in the seaframe designs. The 
Navy will not achieve the capability to meet full requirements for all three 
of the mission packages until 2020, by which time it plans to take delivery 
of 24 ships.220 
Based on these facts and the LCS’s tremendous degradations, limitations to combat 
ability, and soaring construction costs, the $600 million plus price tag for these vessels is 
an insufficient use of defense spending for a new maritime security combatant. 
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G. COMBATANT WINNER: OLIVER HAZARD PERRY FRIGATE (FFG-7) 
The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates are well proven surface combatants, which 
if reproduced and placed back into the U.S. Navy’s fleet force structure would be an 
indispensable and cost effective solution for counternarcotics and other maritime security 
missions. The LCS class, because of its cost growth issues, survivability, and mission 
module uncertainties has failed to meet the capabilities and readiness gaps that the Perry 
class frigates maintained for 30 years. Moreover, former Secretary of Defense Hagel’s 
2014 statement “to submit alternative proposals to procure a more lethal and survivable 
small surface combatant with capabilities consistent with those of a frigate”221 point 
directly to reviving the Oliver Hazard Perry’s design and proven performance. 
The Perry class frigate design is old and is consistent with 1970s architecture. 
Yet, the effectiveness of the hull and design is proven from 30 plus years of data and 
service accolades. To address the former Secretary’s remarks of obtaining a more lethal 
and survivable combatant, it is more cost and time efficient to update and produce the 
Perry class.222 To redesign, construct, and test a new frigate is not affordable for defense 
leaders at this time. That said, addressing the multi-mission role of a modern day frigate 
and the simple patrol/counternarcotics mission, I propose to begin construction of the 
Perry class frigate, but in two different variants to fulfill the Navy’s dying need for 
strength in numbers. The two variants: Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) and a Fast Frigate 
(FF). These two variants demonstrate the ability for the U.S. Navy to supplement their 
fleet with numerous battle-proven and cost effective platforms (one variant with 
conventional guided missile capabilities and the other variant with patrol and law 
enforcement capabilities) to “count against the Navy’s goal for achieving and 
maintaining a fleet of 308 ships”223 in its 30-year (FY2016-FY2045) shipbuilding plan.  
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1. Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) 
The modern Perry class FFG would be essential in providing additional support to 
U.S. Navy cruiser and destroyer battle groups, and will alleviate the need for multiple 
high price assets deployed, resulting in more time for routine maintenance. The new FFG 
would be much similar to its predecessor. Its overall design and architecture, survivability 
standards, engineering plant, and aircraft capabilities should mimic the old Perry class 
entirely. The only changes would come to the combat systems suite where the old MK 13 
missile launcher (formerly removed from the older Perrys), should be replaced with a 
small Vertical Launch System (VLS) to accommodate a surface guided anti-air defense 
missile like the SM2, as well as the offensive Harpoon anti-ship missile, and Evolved 
Sea-Sparrow Missiles.224 In addition, the combat systems controls should be updated with 
newer and smaller fire control radars, surface search radars, and an electronic warfare 
suite. To achieve this multi-role frigate, it does not require re-designing or restructuring 
the platform; rather, duplicating the Australians updated Perry (Adelaide) class frigates. 
These platforms already accommodate the proposed changes and are proving as a 
formidable asset to the Australian Navy.225 
2. Fast Frigate (FF Patrol Frigate) 
The maritime security/patrol frigate (FF) would be the essential patrol combatant 
for the counternarcotics mission, as well as aiding in humanitarian efforts. This variant’s 
design, structural and engineering requirements are duplicates of the newly updated FFG. 
The major difference is that these vessels would be a guided missile-less version of the 
FFG, thus dropping the “G” from its designation to (FF). These patrol craft would not 
have missiles, fire control radars, or electronic warfare suites onboard, conserving weight 
and providing increased speed. Thus, the (FF) would be aircraft capable like that of its 
fellow FFG, and the ship’s armament will be as those of the retired Perry class used in 
counternarcotics missions: multiple .50 and .247 caliber machine gun mounts, top 
                                                 





mounted 76-mm Mark 75 deck gun, and one aft mounted 20-mm Mk 15	 Close in 
Weapons System (CIWS).226  
Considering the immense surface weaponry and the centralized mission on 
counternarcotics, the FF would also be fitted with small additional upgrades essential for 
these missions. The forward location where the FFG’s missile bay is located would be 
designed to accommodate a storage facility for seized narcotics. This capability would 
give ship’s crew the ability to load the contraband from the top deck down, sealing it in 
the storage holding area until time to pull into port for offload. Additionally, the ship 
would be fitted with four small holding cells for those traffickers intercepted, and these 
vessels would have semi-upgraded helicopter hangars to accommodate the MH-60 
helicopters and UAV MQ-8B Fire Scouts alike. These upgrades and aircraft launching 
capabilities give the FF patrol frigate an immense advantage in conducting search and 
seizure missions against the maritime narcotic trade.  
3. FFG and FF Price 
A key question when introducing any type of new or old weapons system is: what 
will the cost be? This particular case is interesting because the U.S. Navy has never 
retired a vessel class and brought it back. So, establishing a set productions price is 
difficult. However, based on the Oliver Hazard Perry’s previous production price tag, we 
can assert estimates close to modern production costs for both variants.  
The original Perry class frigates presented the Navy with a highly capable surface 
combatant at a fraction of the price of other ships in the Navy. Their $194 million per unit 
cost,227 as a result of inflation, carries an estimated $708 million in 2016 dollars.228 
Though this price appears higher than the LCS, the Perry class FFG is a proven capable 
platform not in need of significant research and development price increases like that of 
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the LCS. Current LCS figures reach nearly $600 million in recent years, not including 
their mission packages (needed for mission success), and the vessels have significant 
survivability issues which defense leaders expect an additional $65-$70 million229 in 
structural modifications on top of its current price point. At these estimations, the LCS is 
reaching in excess of $700 million in price; but, one fact will continue to remain, will it 
be able to meet its designed specifications/mission sets, and it will it be as survivable as 
the Perry class FFG? The LCS program’s 12-year history does not support these 
proposed notions. 
The new Perry FFG and FF could be cost effective vessels that will exceed those 
expectations of the hopeful LCS. Similar to the planned shipbuilding contracts for the 
LCS (before multiple issues were discovered in the design and mission modules) and 
other previous naval platforms, the newly constructed Perry FFG is capable of staying 
below the $600 million price tag with the aid of building the FF variant in the same 
shipyard. Based on this notion, building multiple baseline platforms in the same shipyard 
would create a bulk buy price tag, driving the per unit cost down. Additionally, because 
the FF variant would not have expensive technological weapons, weapons systems, and 
sensors installed on them, this variant's price tag would be a fraction of its guided missile 
variant counterpart. Thus, these FF variants can potentially be built around the $400- 
$500 million price point. In turn, consistently producing multiple baseline platforms at 
$400-$600 million (depending on the Navy’s need for an FFG or more FF’s), gives the 
U.S. Navy flexibility in determining its future fleet force structure. In conclusion, the 
Perry class frigates’ historical operational capabilities, unforeseen major design changes, 
and expected price point demonstrates why it is a better option for use as a multirole and 
counternarcotics frigate over the LCS or a newly designed surface combatant.  
                                                 




VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The immense threat of transnational criminal organizations is severely detrimental 
to United States security and their neighboring economic and security partnerships. Most 
notably, these organizations threaten western regional stability and governmental 
legitimacy, propagate violent criminal activity, and promote terrorism.230 In turn, their 
primary income source—narcotics trafficking—must be eliminated from its main 
transportation routes on the high seas. This mission requires stable and proven 
interdiction ships, capable of employing weapons, launching helicopter reconnaissance 
operations, and deploying boarding teams to interdict those narcotics. In addition, when 
not engaged in such operations, these vessels must be malleable and easily adaptable for 
training with foreign navies and coast guards during other maritime security missions. 
Maritime security operations do not require a great deal of technology or 
sophisticated weaponry to effectively conduct these missions. Often, the U.S. Department 
of Defense relies heavily on technology in modern day operations and not enough on 
what they know and consistently works well. The Oliver Hazard Perry frigate 
demonstrated this consistency for 30 plus years, and up to its final deployment of the last 
OHP frigate in service in 2015, proved to be a formidable asset in counternarcotics 
operations. The LCS however, does not demonstrate this consistency nor is it the answer 
for future maritime security operations. Their inconsistency, lethality, and survivability 
issues potentially pose complications to maritime security operations and the other 
missions. Department of Defense leaders and naval superiors alike are consistently 
searching for answers, hoping the LCS platform will achieve its designed mission 
capabilities; however, these chances appear to be unlikely given their plagued history. 
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Based on the research and finding of this thesis, it is important to consider a few 
recommendations based on the current narcotics threat to maritime security: 
 Cease all construction and funding for the LCS program beyond the 24 
vessels currently under contract in the dual strategy block buy format. 
Additionally, do not fund the research and development for lethality and 
survivability modifications to current and under contract vessels, and 
cease all future funding for procurement, research and development of the 
LCS’s mission modules. 
 Reinstitute the plans for constructing brand new (battle proven) Oliver 
Hazard Perry frigates. Utilize liaisons with Australian ship designers on 
making the required minimal modernized upgrades that exists on their 
current formidable upgraded OHP FFG frigates, and then begin design 
modifications for the less weaponized FF for counternarcotics and other 
maritime security operations. 
 Cease all research and development of a new small surface combatant 
currently being developed based on the current LCS hulls. Utilizing these 
vessels, as a baseline design is inefficient and not effective based on 
existing issues. As O’Rourke criticizes, “Before you commit tax payer 
dollars to a weapons program, you traditionally take three steps: 1. 
Identify capability gaps and mission needs; 2. Compare potential general 
approaches for filling those capability gaps or mission’s needs; 3. Refine 
the approach selected as the best or most promising.”231 The proposed 
redevelopment of a new surface combatant based on the LCS design 
disregards the initial two steps.232 
It is imperative for future maritime security and counternarcotic operations to 
have a proven, stable, and lethal combatant. The most proven and logical candidate for 
those operations points toward reconstructing the retired Oliver Hazard Perry frigate 
class. However, because the less capable LCS ships are under contract for 24 vessels and 
construction stoppage unforeseeable, it is imperative for the LCS to fulfill maritime 
security and counternarcotic operations until construction of the new Perry is completed. 
Once construction is complete, the new Perry fast frigates will regain control of thwarting 
further narcotic trafficking on the high seas.   
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